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Freedom of the High Seas Versus the




In December 1982, the United States and several other leading
industrial powers declined to sign the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. It is now possible that seabed mining will
proceed under a reciprocating states regime based on unilateral
legislation. This legislation has been justified on the basis of the
principle of the freedom of the high seas. The Group of 77 has
branded this legislation as being contrary to international law
based on the principle of the common heritage of mankind. This
article embodies an analysis of these competing claims.
INTRODUCTION: A CLAssIC CONFRONTAION BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Freedom of the Seas versus Sovereignty
For centuries past, many of the principal features of the inter-
national law of the sea have been formed by the interplay be-
tween two opposing fundamental principles of international law,
the principle of sovereignty and the principle of the freedom of
the high seas. The ascendancy of one over the other during any
particular historical period has tended to reflect the interests of
the predominant powers of the day. Thus, the monopolist ambi-
tions of the Iberian powers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
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ries were mirrored in their attempts to establish a mare clausum
over large parts of the seas, just as the United Provinces of the
seventeenth century and Elizabeth's England recognized that
their best interests lay in promoting the opposite doctrine of mare
liberum.1 That these dynamic forces are by no means exhausted
is witnessed by the still continuing changes brought about in mar-
itime boundaries in recent years. The days are not so far distant
when the outer limit of the territorial sea could be taken to mark
the boundary landward of which sovereignty held sway and en-
joyed legal presumptions in its favor, while seawards, the pre-
sumptions favored the predominant principle of freedom of high
seas. With the recent introduction of legal continental shelves
and exclusive fishing zones, sovereignty made considerable in-
roads on the scope of the freedom of the seas ratione materiae.
The exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the
continental shelf were to be henceforth the object of the sover-
eign rights of the coastal State. Similarly, the fishery resources of
the exclusive fishery zone were to be the exclusive preserve of
the coastal State. On the other hand, this seaward push of sover-
eignty did not affect the scope of the freedom of the seas ratione
loci or alter the legal presumptions in its favor. With the even
more recent acceptance of the concept of the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), the balance has swung more heavily in favor of the
principle of sovereignty. Admittedly, the EEZ is a zone sui
generis but the safeguards for the freedom of the high seas writ-
ten into the new Convention on the Law of the Sea appear less
than impressive when measured against the exclusive rights ac-
corded to the coastal State.
2
Freedom of the Seas versus Common Heritage of Mankind
While the principle of the freedom of the seas continues the
traditional battle with its ancient adversary in these offshore
zones, it now finds that it is also under attack right in the heart of
its empire by a new pretender whose objective is to establish the
fundamental principle that the seabed beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction and the resources thereof are the common heri-
tage of mankind. We are thus faced with the paradoxical position
that, on one front, the principle of freedom of the seas is under
attack by a principle of sovereignty motivated by the desire of
coastal States to acquire exclusive rights in the fishery and min-
1. See Brown, Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 157-59 (1973).
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 55-75, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Convention].
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eral resources of the offshore zones, while, on another front, the
principle of the freedom of the seas is being advanced in defense
of exclusive rights to exploit seabed resources and against the at-
tempt to establish these resources as a new species of res com-
munis, a common heritage of mankind.
The Need for a Reassessment
At first sight, the need for a paper on this subject at this time
may not be self-evident. The status of the seabed and the regime
governing seabed mining under international customary law have
been considered in innumerable contributions to the literature
and many of them have been published very recently. There are,
nonetheless, two persuasive reasons for returning to this subject
yet again.
The first reason arises from President Reagan's statement of
July 9, 1982 that the United States would not sign the new Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea adopted on April 30, 1982 at the
close of the Eleventh Session of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1II).3 This decision would
seem to confirm that, unless there is a quite unexpected re-open-
ing of negotiations on the Convention, the present United States
administration is now firmly committed to a policy of encouraging
the further development of seabed mining outside the conven-
tional framework. It may be assumed that the administration will
wish to conclude a mini-treaty with like-minded States, under
which their similarly drafted unilateral legislation would be coor-
dinated on an international basis and mining licenses granted
under such legislation would be reciprocally recognized. 4
Whether the way forward for the United States is via such a mini-
treaty or independently under its own national legislation, Presi-
dent Reagan's announcement also increases the likelihood that
Mr. Tommy Koh, the president of UNCLOS III, will proceed with
his reported intention 5 to try to persuade the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality under international law of
unilateral seabed mining legislation such as the United States
3. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 18, 1982, at 6, col 1.
4. See Brown, The Impact of Unilateral Legislation on the Future Legal Re-
gime of Deep-Sea Mining, 20 ARCHIv DES VoLKERRECnTs 145 (1982).
5. The Financial Times (London), May 4, 1982, at 4, col. 7.
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980.6 Since the
United States has consistently justified this legislation by refer-
ence to the principle of the freedom of the high seas, it seems ap-
propriate to review the scope of this principle in relation to
seabed mining.
The second reason for returning to this subject is that much of
the recent writing on it exhibits a very low level of objectivity and
appears to be designed to support a priori conclusions. The no-
tion of the common heritage of mankind, like the more compre-
hensive plans to create a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), has generated a great deal of emotion among interna-
tional publicists and the objectivity which must underlie sound
legal scholarship has been less in evidence than commitment to
particular economic and political philosophies. It is probably not
an exaggeration to suggest that some academics appear to have
been affected by an insidious malaise which drives them inexora-
bly towards certain pre-ordained conclusions. They feel a need to
identify themselves with a particular policy position and to inter-
pret the law accordingly. Very broadly, there is the "liberal" or
"internationalist" school which favors the NIEO and the common
heritage principle and supports the detailed common heritage re-
gime incorporated in the new Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In "internationalist" circles-and particularly among academics-
it would appear that there is almost a stigma attached to any
writer who is unfortunate enough to come to the conclusion that
deep sea mining is still in law a high seas freedom. On the other
side are the businessmen, their advisers and supporters in gov-
ernment and elsewhere, for whom it is an article of faith and a se-
vere test of the "soundness" of a man that he should, at most,
accept the common heritage doctrine with the utmost reluctance
and a becoming skepticism. Allegiance to either of these faiths
presents a considerable barrier to objectivity in analyzing the law.
It can of course be objected that what is being criticized is simply
the application in this field of a policy-oriented jurisprudence. If
so, this may be thought to be another example of the risk run by
adherents to this methodology of confusing community expecta-
tions with their own policy preferences.
The principal object of this paper is, therefore, to anticipate a
possible advisory opinion from the ICJ by attempting to ascertain
the present legal status of the deep seabed and the present legal
regime governing the mining of seabed polymetallic nodules. In
the course of this study, attention will be paid not only to the
"freedom of the high seas" argument apparently favored by most
6. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. V 1981).
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of the potential mining States but also to alternative arguments
and to the impact on them of the new doctrine of the common
heritage of mankind. As will be seen, this is a question which
leads the inquirer to consider some of the basic issues of contem-
porary international law and relations. On a technical level, it is
bound up with questions of methodology and the debate over the
sources of international law and the law-creating role of General
Assembly resolutions. On a political level, it is concerned with
opposing political and economic philosophies, with the struggle
by the developing world to give reality to a NIEO and with the at-
tempt to break the traditional mold of international relations by
securing acceptance of what some regard as the emergent, dy-
namic principle of the common heritage of mankind.
Claims to exclusive rights over seabed resources are not of
course a recent twentieth century phenomenon. The starting
point for any inquiry into the present law must be a review of the
rules of international law which evolved in earlier centuries in re-
sponse to such claims, and a consideration of their possible appli-
cability to the exploitation of polymetallic nodules on the deep
seabed. The next section of this paper is accordingly concerned
with the historical roots of claims to exclusive rights in seabed re-
sources. It is followed by an analysis of the principle of the free-
dom of the high seas and its relevance to deep seabed mining.
The next section is a review of developments since 1967, the year
in which the United Nations became seriously concerned with
this question, and an assessment of the effect of these develop-
ments on pre-existing law. Finally, conclusions are presented.
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CLAIMS TO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN
SEABED RESOURCES
Juridical Basis of Early Claims
Much of the long-standing controversy in the literature over the
question whether the seabed of the high seas shares the res com-
munis status of the superjacent waters or has a separate res nul-
lius status has been a by-product of the related question of
determining the juridical basis of the exclusive rights which, for
many centuries, coastal States have claimed to exploit particular
sedentary fisheries or other seabed resources situated beyond the
normal (territorial sea) limits of national jurisdiction. It is neces-
sary to refer briefly to this controversy here because it raises ba-
sically the same question as that raised by the exclusive claims to
deep sea mineral resources implied in the unilateral legislation
recently adopted by five industrialized States. 7 Moreover, at least
one attempt has been made recently to justify a claim to exclu-
sive rights in a manganese nodule site by reference to this earlier
practice.8
Prior to 1970, when the General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion of Principles Governing the Seabed,9 two possible arguments
were open to* any government wishing to support the right of one
of its nationals to exploit deep seabed minerals. First, it might
contend that the right was one underlying freedom of the high
seas. This viewpoint could be adopted by any State, irrespective
of whether it regarded the seabed as being res communis or res
nullius, assuming in the latter case that a title to the res nullius
had not been acquired. As conceived at that time, the weakness
of this argument was that the right so acquired would have the
same non-exclusive character as the analogous right to dredge for
fish in the high seas. As will be seen, a variation of this freedom
of the high seas argument would permit the acquisition of exclu-
sive rights.
The second argument was based on the practice of States, over
many centuries, in claiming and securing recognition of exclusive
rights in the sedentary fisheries of areas of the seabed beyond
territorial sea limits. Unfortunately, although this is a question
with a long history, it remains a disputed area of international law
where doctrine tends by far to outweigh more reliable forms of
evidence. Moreover, extensive though it is, the literatureO offers
only limited assistance in determining the juridical basis of these
exclusive rights. The earlier literature tended to concentrate on
demonstrating that exclusive rights can and do exist and the
more recent literature has tended to be little more than a re-
hearsal of the earlier arguments, illustrated by reference to the
7. For an analysis of the legislation adopted by the United States (1980), the
Federal Republic of Germany (1980), the United Kingdom (1981), and France
(1981), see Brown, supra note 4. The Soviet Union issued a similar decree on
April 17, 1982. On June 28, 1982, the Italian Council of Ministers approved a bill on
deep sea mining. See 8 ITALY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA NEWSLETrER 10 (July 1982).
8. See Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Re-
quest for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment, Deepsea Ventures,
Inc., (ified with the U.S. Sec'y of State, Nov. 15, 1974); see also Opinion of the Law
Offices of Northcutt Ely on International Law Applicable to Deepsea Mining, Nov.
14, 1974 (on file with author) [hereinafter cited as Northcutt Ely Opinion].
9. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, GA. Res. 2749, 25
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
10. See, e.g., 2 T. KRoNmmznLn, THE LAwrmLxss OF DEEP SEA MIING 5-38
(1980).
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same lists of a variety of commodities from Algerian sponges and
Sri Lankan pearls to Irish oysters. For those seeking to investi-
gate the possible applicability of the governing rules to the acqui-
sition of exclusive title to deep seabed minerals, it would have
been more helpful if an analysis had been provided of the constit-
uent elements of state practice, with a view to establishing not
simply the principle that exclusive rights may be acquired but the
detailed conditions which had to be satisfied in order to acquire
them.
The preponderant view in the literature is that the evidence
supports the proposition that States acquired a "territorial title"
to the areas of the seabed in question. The writer has fully con-
sidered this "territorial title" argument elsewhere1 and it would
be redundant to rehearse it here; nor would it be of practical
assistance in the present context since, even if it could be shown
to have supplied the juridical basis of these earlier rights, it could
hardly be of service today to States seeking to establish exclusive
rights. Any current claim to title over an area of the seabed
would succeed only if it could be consolidated by the express or
implied recognition or acquiescence of the generality of States.12
Developments in the United Nations since 1967 have very clearly
confirmed that no such support could be expected. 3
If, however, the doctrinal wrangling over "prescription," "occu-
pation" and "historical consolidation" as the favored "mode" of
acquisition of title is left aside and the scope of the exclusive
rights acquired in this earlier practice is reconsidered afresh, an
alternative basis for exclusive rights may be identified.
Scope of Exclusive Rights in Earlier State Practice
Scope ratione loci
Without exception, these rights related to resources situated in
shallow waters relatively near the coast. The areas concerned,
certainly in the great majority of cases, were not only within what
today is the legal and physical continental shelf; they were indeed
situated within a few miles of the outer limit of the territorial sea.
Is the restricted nature of this locus legally relevant? The Law
Offices of Northcutt Ely, in their opinion of November 15, 1974,
11. See ED. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDROSPACE 82-86 (1971).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
submitted to Deepsea Ventures, Inc.,14 clearly did not think so.
There the argument was advanced that, prior to the emergence of
the legal concept of the continental shelf, the whole of the seabed
lying seaward of the contemporary limits of national jurisdiction,
the outer limit of the territorial sea, shared the same legal status.
There was no need to distinguish, indeed no basis for distinguish-
ing, between the offshore areas where these valuable seabed re-
sources were exploited and the bed of the deep ocean, the
exploitation of which was beyond contemplation at that time.
Thus, the argument ran, there is no reason to confine the rules
permitting acquisition of exclusive rights to the geographical ar-
eas of their origin; they are equally applicable in other areas shar-
ing the same juridical status.
It is of course true that these early developments took place
against a background of ignorance of the structure and geological/
geomorphic nature of the different submarine areas. The fact re-
mains, however, that the resources were near the coast and it
would not seem extravagant to assume that this fact was signifi-
cant, if not decisive, to both the coastal State's practice of exploit-
ing the resource and the recognition of that State's exclusive right
by other States. The process of claim, recognition of claim and
emergence of legal rule in relation to this early practice is very
similar to the corresponding process which resulted in the emer-
gence of the legal concept of the continental shelf. This might
suggest that the development of the law initiated in this early
practice had come to final fruition in the legal concept of the con-
tinental shelf and that there is no foundation for contending that
this practice is equally relevant in relation to the deep seabed sit-
uated beyond the continental margin at very considerable dis-
tances from coasts.
Scope ratione temporis
The temporal scope of the exclusive rights claimed in these re-
sources was, it would appear, functionally determined. The exclu-
sive right was desired only as long as resources continued to exist
in economic quantities. For example, the coastal State would
have no continuing interest in a submarine coal seam once it was
mined out. Nor would exclusive rights in coral, sponges or pearls
continue to be claimed if, for long-term environmental reasons,
they ceased to exist as an economically feasible resource. This
question is closely related to that of the juridical nature of the ex-
clusive right. Whereas "territorial title" is appropriate or neces-
14. See Northcutt Ely Opinion, supra note 8.
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sary if the intention or need is to have permanent exclusive rights
over the seabed itself, it is not necessary in relation to exclusive
resource rights. This is a relevant distinction because it draws at-
tention to the fact that the conditions required to be satisfied for
acquisition of "territorial title" are not necessarily those required
to be satisfied for acquisition of exclusive rights in resources.
What were the conditions for acquisition of exclusive resource
rights? Reduced to their essentials, they were the actual asser-
tion of exclusive rights and their recognition, express or implied,
by other States. The precise elements of the assertion of exclu-
sive rights varied from case to case but included a mixture of
some or all of the following: regulation by domestic legislation;
exclusion of foreigners; and guarding the area. These manifesta-
tions of state authority are of course identical to the display nec-
essary to acquire a territorial title by occupation and it is hardly
surprising therefore that the exclusive rights claimed were so
characterized. The fact remains, however, that what was sought
and recognized was in essence a right of usufruct-an exclusive
right to exploit the particular resource in the particular area.
Scope ratione personae
Here again, reference must be made to the Northcutt Ely opin-
ion, wherein a distinction was sought to be made between the ac-
quisition of an exclusive right-which could be accomplished by a
corporation-and the protection of the right on the international
plane-which could be provided only by government.'5
Perhaps it will suffice to say that this is clearly not the view of
the United States government. In recognizing that United States
corporations are free to mine the seabed, government spokesmen
have consistently referred to deep seabed mining as constituting
a high seas freedom under international law. It is the interna-
tional person, the United States, which has the right under inter-
national law to enjoy this freedom in the person of its nationals.
The true position is revealed if it is pointed out that the alleged
right of the corporation could be abrogated at any time by its
home government. The corporation has no right in international
law separate from that of its state of nationality.
15. Id. at 32-43.
Scope ratione materiae
Finally, what was the scope ratione materiae of the exclusive
rights claimed in this early practice? The list of resources is well
known and includes coral, pearls, sponges and oysters. It did not,
simply as a matter of fact, include polymetallic nodules, though
there is little doubt that it would have, if such nodules had ex-
isted and been known to exist in marketable quantities in these
marginal waters.
Conclusions
What conclusions may one legitimately draw from this analy-
sis? Perhaps the following propositions are justifiable:
1. The exclusive rights recognized in this early practice
related to resources situated near the coast of the
claimant State.
2. The claim to these resources and its recognition were
probably not unconnected with the element of
nearness.
3. This practice came to final fruition in the legal con-
cept of the continental shelf. Historically, it has no
link with the deep seabed beyond the continental
margin.
4. The fact that the duration of the exclusive right
claimed is tied to the duration of the existence of the
economic resource points to the fact that the right
claimed is an exclusive usufruct and not a title to the
seabed itself.
5. Only States may acquire such rights.
6. Historically, polymetallic nodules did not feature
among the resources to which exclusive rights were
claimed but there is no reason to doubt that, in princi-
ple, they could have been the object of a claim.
7. The exclusive right depended upon the two basic ele-
ments of practical manifestation of the intention to as-
sert an exclusive right and its recognition, express or
implied, by other States.
8. The overall conclusion must be therefore that there is
evidence to show that, prior to the establishment of
the legal concept of the continental shelf, States could
acquire an exclusive usufruct of resources situated on
the seabed of the continental margin by the practical,
effective assertion of such claims, recognized by
others. The realistic view is that such rights have now
been subsumed under the concept of the legal conti-
[VOL. 20: 521, 1983] Fundamental Principles
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
nental shelf and the argument that they furnish a
fruitful source of analogy for exclusive title to manga-
nese nodules is strained.
Even if it were to be held that the analogy was valid and that
exclusive rights to deep seabed resources could be acquired today
in the same way, it would still be necessary for such rights to be
recognized or at least acquiesced in by other States. It would
seem to follow, given the opposition of the vast majority of States
to the establishment of such exclusive rights, that there is no pos-
sibility at the present time for States to acquire exclusive mineral
rights to deposits of manganese nodules on the basis of these
rules.
The Northcutt Ely Argument
One possible way out of this impasse is suggested by the argu-
ment presented in the aforementioned Northcutt Ely opinion.
Having argued that the exclusive right claimed in earlier state
practice was "in the nature of a right to take specific resources,
like a profit a prendre or usufruct," the opinion went on to assert
that this exclusive right was enjoyed in the valid exercise of a
freedom of the high seas.16
The argument is a brave but hardly convincing attempt to ar-
range a marriage of apparently incompatible partners. The objec-
tive was, of course, to show that the client was entitled to acquire
an exclusive title to a particular deposit of deep seabed minerals.
The first step in the argument was to prove that the present-day
deep seabed beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction
had the same status as the seabed beyond the earlier (territorial
sea) limits of national jurisdiction in relation to which the earlier
state practice had taken place. The argument was simply that,
when this practice took place, there was one undifferentiated area
of seabed underlying the high seas and there was no reason to
doubt that the rules evidenced by this practice continued to have
application in the whole of the remaining seabed underlying the
high seas, despite the introduction of new maritime zones in the
area of the continental margin.
Having thus purported to establish the transferability of the le-
gal regime from its original locus to the deep seabed, the next
16. Id. at 28.
step was to interpret the evidence provided by the earlier practice
by reference to legal concepts and principles which were as com-
patible as possible with the emerging common heritage regime,
while still alowing for the acquisition of exclusive rights. To have
viewed that practice in terms of the seabed being res nullius and
the exclusive rights being in the nature of "territorial titles" ac-
quired by prescription or occupation would have been to invite
confrontation with the fundamental ban on the acquisition of sov-
ereignty in the seabed which lies at the heart of the common heri-
tage regime. It was thus much more advantageous to interpret
the ambiguous state practice as reflecting the res communis na-
ture of the seabed and as evidencing the establishment of a rule
whereby exclusive rights in the nature of a usufruct could be ac-
quired to the resources of the seabed. Here, then, was the basis
for a marriage of convenience between the freedom of the high
seas (to which normally the notion of exclusive titles is quite
alien) and exclusive rights of exploitation. The way was then
open to arguing that when this regime was applied to deep seabed
mineral resources today, it would be seen that the right to acquire
exclusive rights of exploitation was a valid exercise of a high seas
freedom.
The argument has two major weaknesses. The first arises from
the proposition that the regime established in relation to the sea-
bed of the marginal seas is transferable to the deep seabed. As
previously explained, this is a highly debatable proposition. A
more serious weakness, however, is that the evidence does not
bear out the contention that the acquisition of exclusive rights in
the earlier practice was regarded, or could be regarded, as the ex-
ercise of a high seas freedom. On the contrary, such claims were
accepted as recognized exceptions to the principle of the freedom
of the seas in the same way as, in later times, the coastal State's
sovereign rights in the resources of the continental shelf were ac-
cepted as exceptions to the regime of the high seas.
It is arguable that the Northcutt Ely opinion sought to prove too
much by trying to marry the notion of exclusive usufruct to the
freedom of the seas and that it would have been more profitable
to have concentrated on a freedom-of-the-high-seas argument
alone. This is in fact the route chosen by the principal industrial-
ized States which have adopted unilateral legislation. They are at
one in basing the legality of their enactments on the principle of
the freedom of the high seas.17 It is necessary, therefore, to ex-
amine the nature of this principle rather more closely.
17. See Brown, supra note 4, at 148-50.
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THE FREEDOM OF THE IGH SEAS
Essential Character of the Principle
Despite recent encroachment upon it, the freedom of the high
seas is still a fundamental principle of international law. The
powerful presumption in favor of freedom of use of the high seas,
one of the most important rules underlying the principle, was de-
scribed by Professor Schwarzenberger in his Hague Lectures in
1955:
Under international customary law, the right of use of the high seas, the
air space above them and the seabed may be exercised for any purposes
not expressly prohibited by international law as, for instance, for sea and
air navigation, fishing, laying of cables and pipelines, naval exercises and
wartime operations.1 8
The doubt which existed at that time as to whether the right of
use was of an absolute character has since been clearly resolved
and it is now recognized that only a right of reasonable use
exists.19
It follows from these characteristics of the freedom of the high
seas that the principal questions to be considered are whether
there is any rule of international law prohibiting deepsea mining
as a freedom of the seas and, if there is no such general prohibi-
tory rule, what is the effect on freedom of deep sea mining of the
rule that this freedom must be exercised by all States with rea-
sonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
freedom of the high seas?
18. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
RECUEiL DES CouRs 195, 360 (1955).
19. This is confirmed by, inter alia, article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas, which provides that-
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.LA.S. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, 82.
Is There a Prohibitory Rule?
The most obvious candidate for this role is the rule prohibiting
the appropriation of areas of the high seas. 20 This is by no means
an absolute rule; and the more precise question is whether it ex-
tends to the type of "appropriation" involved in claims to exclu-
sive rights of exploitation in specific deep seabed mining sites.
The first point to clarify is the nature of the appropriation typi-
cally involved in such a claim. The area of a seabed mine site will
depend upon various physical variables but in this context it will
suffice to provide a rough indication of the size of area involved
by referring to the dimensions specified in UNCLOS resolution 11
governing preparatory investment in pioneer activities relating to
polymetallic nodules.21 In terms of the resolution, "pioneer inves-
tors" may have single "pioneer areas" allocated tothem. Such pi-
oneer areas are not to exceed 150,000 square kilometers but fifty
percent of this area (and possibly more) has to be relinquished to
the international Area over an eight-year period. The ultimate
private exploitation area in each site will therefore not exceed
75,000 square kilometers. According to one authoritative source,
the pre-production stages of a pioneer venture would take about
twenty-three years to complete, and full production would then
run for about twenty to twenty-four years.22 The physical pres-
ence of the miner on the mine site would not present a significant
threat to the freedom of the high seas, assuming of course that
the area was chosen and operations conducted with reasonable
regard for the interests of other users. The "fleet" of one or two
mining ships, support vessels, bulk ore carriers and possibly
spoil-dumping vessels would be of modest proportions. There
would unquestionably be some environmental impact but, assum-
ing again that the site was operated with reasonable regard for
the interests of other users, it would probably not be dispropor-
tionate or long-lasting.23 Likewise, the degree of control over the
movements of third parties in the waters superjacent to the site
would be of a very limited nature. Apart from protecting their ex-
clusive rights in the site, miners would be chiefly concerned with
the physical protection of their mining operations and safety at
sea.
Thus the principal question is whether an operation conducted
20. See id.
21. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex I, res. H, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
22. J. NYHART, TOwARD DEEP OCEAN MINING IN THE NINETms 30 (Mass. Inst. of
Technology Rep. No. 82-1, 1982).
23. See R. FRANi, DEEP SEA MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Am. Soc. of Int'l
Law, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 10, 1976).
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in such an area, for such a time, with such a fleet and involving
such an environmental impact and surface control is tantamount
to the kind of appropriation of an area of the high seas which
would fall within the scope of the prohibition. Prima facie, the an-
swer would seem to be that it is not. The claim would be to a usu-
fruct rather than to the seabed itself and would be for a limited
period of time. Subject to its being kept within the bounds of rea-
sonableness, both in terms of locus and conduct of operations, it
would seem to be a legitimate use.
Nor is this tentative conclusion invalidated by a consideration
of the proposition that an exclusive claim is necessarily contrary
to the freedom of'the high seas. It has been suggested that since
exclusivity is a sine qua non of deepsea mining in economic
terms, exclusive use is a reasonable use.24 This is a persuasive ar-
gument. In determining whether a particular freedom is being ex-
ercised "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, '25 one is concerned
with questions of balance, proportionality, and equity. In this
case, the elements to be balanced would be, on the one hand, the
commercial necessity of the security of tenure which only exclu-
sive use could ensure and, on the other hand, the damage suf-
fered by other States as a result. In the context of the pre-1967
regime of the seabed, it is difficult to see that any significant dam-
age would be suffered by other States, provided of course that the
areas worked were well away from established shipping routes
and fishing areas, that appropriate measures were adopted for the
protection of the environment, and that surface operations were
conducted in such a manner as not to create shipping hazards.
As was mentioned above, the prohibition of the exclusive ap-
propriation of areas of the high seas is not in any event an abso-
lute rule unless it is much more precisely defined. It is all a
question of degree and, once again, of reasonableness and propor-
tionality. It is true that the exercise of any use by state A in-
volves an element of exclusivity in the sense that state B is
thereby 1revented from exercising that use at the same time and
place. In most cases, however, such as navigation and fishing, the
exclusion is virtually momentary. If navigation and fishing are at
24. Nyhart The Interplay of Law and Technology in Deep Seabed Mining Is-
sues, 15 VA. J. IN'L L. 827, 865 (1974-75).
25. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, art 2.
one end of the spectrum and seabed mining is at the other, inter-
mediate cases are presented by the freedom to lay cables and
pipelines, the freedom to construct artificial islands and other in-
stallations on the seabed, and the freedom to close off areas of the
high seas for military maneuvers and weapons testing.
In short, if one descends from the level of generalized abstract
rules to examine the particular rules actually operating in state
practice, one finds an absence of any rule prohibiting seabed min-
ing as a freedom of the seas. The only prohibition is against sea-
bed mining unreasonably conducted.
It was stressed at the beginning of this section that the right of
use of the high seas may be exercised for any purpose not ex-
pressly prohibited by international law. Thus, the onus of proof
lies on those seeking to assert the existence of a prohibitory rule.
There is no need to positively establish the existence of a right of
use. This is not to say, of course, that it would not be useful to
buttress the presumption in favor of freedom of use by adducing
positive evidence that deep seabed mining is a recognized use. In
fact, however, such evidence is scant.
The travaux pr~paratoires of article 2 of the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas are frequently cited in support of the legitimacy of
such a use. While it is true that passages in the International Law
Commission's (ILC) reports do support this view, it has to be said
that the passages in question are unreasoned and very much
obiter dictum. All that the ILC said in its 1955 report was that
"[i]t is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to
explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas ... .,26 Moreover,
in its 1956 report it added simply that:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore
or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the
case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continen-
tal shelf-a case dealt with separately in section II below-such exploita-




Taking into consideration the review of earlier state practice,
the analysis of the principle of the freedom of the high seas and
the evidence provided by the reports of the ILC, the most reason-
able, if still somewhat tentative, conclusion would seem to be that
26. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 2, U.N. Doc. 2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B.
IW'L L. CoimM'N 21, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/SER.A/1955/Add.l.
27. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. CoAi'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.
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seabed mining conducted with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in exercising their freedoms of the high seas is a
legitimate use of the high seas. The next question is whether that
position has been changed as a result of developments in the
United Nations and elsewhere since 1967.
THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1967
The Maltese Initiative
On August 17, 1967, Malta addressed a note verbale to the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations requesting the inclusion in the
General Assembly's agenda of the following item: "Declaration
and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful
purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the
use of their resources in the interests of mankind."
28
The following passages were included in the supporting
memorandum:
3. It is, therefore, considered that the time has come to declare the sea-
bed and the ocean floor a common heritage of mankind and that imme-
diate steps should be taken to draft a treaty embodying, inter alia, the
following principles:
(a) The sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the
limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject to national ap-
propriation in any manner whatsoever;
(c) The use of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and their economic
exploitation shall be undertaken with the aim of safeguarding the in-
terests of mankind. The net financial benefits derived from the use
and exploitation of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor shall be used pri-
marily to promote the development of poor countries.
2 9
The question to be considered is the extent to which this initia-
tive and the instruments to which it ultimately gave rise have af-
fected the law as it was prior to August 17, 1967. The principal
fruits of Ambassador Pardo's initiative are the series of General
Assembly resolutions on this subject and the Convention and as-
sociated resolutions adopted by UNCLOS I on April 30, 1982.
General Assembly Resolutions
While it is true that the germinal ideas reflected in the Maltese
28. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 92) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
29. Id.
note verbale were incorporated in General Assembly resolutions
regularly over the years,30 with two exceptions, these ideas were
not appreciably developed in those resolutions. The notion of the
"common heritage of mankind," the prohibition of national appro-
priation and the commitment to benefit poor countries remained
at their original high level of abstraction and generality except in
the so-called Moratorium Resolution 3l and the Declaration of
Principles Resolution.3 2 It will suffice, therefore, to consider the
effect of these two resolutions alone.
The Legal Effect of General Assembly Resolutions
The general rule is quite clear and has been stated as follows
by Judge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion in the South West
Africa-Voting Procedure case:
Although decisions of the General Assembly are endowed with full legal
effect in some spheres of the activity of the United Nations and with lim-
ited legal effect in other spheres, it may be said, by way of a broad gener-
alization, that they are not legally binding upon the Members of the
United Nations. In some matters-such as the election of the Secretary-
General, election of members of the Economic and Social Council and of
some members of the Trusteeship Council, the adoption of rules of proce-
dure, admission to, suspension from and termination of membership, and
approval of the budget and the apportionment of expenses-the full legal
effects of the Resolutions of the General Assembly are undeniable. But,
in general, they are in the nature of recommendations and it is in the na-
ture of recommendations that, although on proper occasions they provide
a legal authorization for Members determined to act upon them individu-
ally or collectively, they do not create a legal obligation to comply with
them.
3 3
Those seeking to bestow greater law-creating powers on the
General Assembly frequently resort to selective quotation from
the Memorandum of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs on
the Use of the Terms "Declaration and Recommendation".34 Read
out of context, paragraph three of the memorandum does indeed
appear to assist their cause in stating that: "In United Nations
practice, a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn instrument, suita-
30. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/
6964 (1967); GA. Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7477
(1968); G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/7834
(1969); G.A. Res. 2881, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 38, U.N. Doc. A/8623 (1971);
G.A. Res. 3029, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/8949 (1972); GA.
Res. 3067, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/9278 (1973); GA. Res.
3334, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/L.747 (1974); GA. Res. 3483,
30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/L.782 (1975); GA. Res. 31/63, 31
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/31/L4 (1976).
31. GA Res. 2574, 24 GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7834 (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as Moratorium Resolution].
32. See supra note 9.
33. South West Africa-Voting Procedure, 1955 LCJ. 67, 115.
34. 18 U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610 (1962).
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ble for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting impor-
tance are being enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human
Rights. A recommendation is less formal."35 However, paragraph
four puts rather a different gloss on the matter.
Apart from the distinction just indicated, there is probably no difference
between a "recommendation" or a "declaration" in United Nations prac-
tice as far as strict legal principle is concerned. A "declaration" or a "rec-
ommendation" is adopted by resolution of a United Nations organ. As
such it cannot be made binding upon Member States, in the sense that a
treaty or convention is binding upon the parties to it, purely by the device
of terming it a "declaration" rather than a "recommendation." However,
in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a "declaration," it may
be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expec-
tation that Members of the international community will abide by it. Con-
sequently, in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down
rules binding upon States.
3 6
There are two main points to note from this quotation. Nega-
tively, General Assembly resolutions, irrespective of nomencla-
ture, do not create binding legal rules except in the limited
category of cases referred to in the above passage from Judge
Lauterpacht's opinion. Positively, however, the adoption of the
resolution may constitute part of a wider process through which
binding rules are created. The memorandum speaks of the decla-
ration gradually maturing into rules of customary law binding
upon States and it may well be that a particular declaration will
reflect and give precise formulation to an opinio juris which has
been maturing in the international community. Alternatively, a
declaration may act as a catalyst and, by "impart[ing] ... a
strong expectation that Members of the international community
will abide by it," 3 encourage the development of rules of custom-
ary law. Again, the wider process of law creation, of which the
adoption of the declaration is part, may take an alternative form.
A number of States might enter into a treaty or other consensual
arrangement committing them to recognize the binding effect of
the terms of a declaration; or individual States might bind them-
selves to observance of its terms through unilateral acts.
In all such cases, however, the text of the declaration and the
act of its adoption provide little more than the inert material. It is
the additional catalyst provided by (1) state practice before, dur-
35. Id. para. 3.
36. Id. para. 4.
37. Id.
ing and following the adoption of the resolution, or (2) a related
consensual engagement, or (3) a unilateral act, which creates the
binding legal rule. This is not to deny that the form, the degree of
precision and the proportionate vote by which a declaration is
adopted are without influence. Clearly, if the resolution is called
a "declaration" rather than a "recommendation" or "resolution"; if
it purports to be a declaration of "legal principles"; if it is formu-
lated in precise, treaty-like form; if it is adopted unanimously or
by a very substantial majority, including the States principally
concerned with its subject matter, all these strong, formative fac-
tors will lend weight to "the strong expectation that Members of
the international community will abide by it."38 They will doubt-
lessly influence state practice in the matter. But the operation of
the law-creating process is still necessary to complete the act of
creating a binding rule.
Does regular repetition of similar resolutions or frequent recita-
tion of a resolution affect its capacity to create binding legal
rules? If one is considering the legal effect of the resolution as
such, it is difficult to differ from Professor MacGibbon's conclu-
sion that "[h] owever many times a recommendation is multiplied
it is still at the end of the day a recommendation and not a bind-
ing legal obligation."39 On the other hand, it is obvious that a
series of resolutions adopted by large majorities may well have a
greater impact on state behavior than a single resolution. Even
here, however, it would be advisable to ponder Professor MacGib-
bon's perceptive comment that: "It is by no means obvious
whether the twentieth or thirtieth resolution in any series should
be viewed as adding to the strength (quite apart from the legal
weight) of the call for action or rather as drawing attention to the
ineffectuality of the predecessor in the series."40
38. Id.
39. MacGibbon, Means for the Identification of International Law. General
Assembly Resolutions: Custom Practice and Mistaken Identity, in INTERNATIONAL
IAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 10, 17 (B. Cheng ed. 1982).
40. Id. at 16 n.24. Judge Lauterpacht's above-mentioned separate opinion is
frequently cited on this subject and, as will be seen, it has apparently influenced
the attitude of the United States Government. However, in seeking guidance from
this opinion, one has to proceed with great caution. Practically everything which
was said about the legal effect of General Assembly recommendations referred to
those addressed to South Africa by the General Assembly, acting in a supervisory
capacity in relation to the South West Africa Mandate. In one passage, for exam-
ple, Judge Lauterpacht expressed the view that
Although there is no automatic obligation to accept fully a particular rec-
ommendation or series of recommendations, there is a legal obligation to
act in good faith in accordance with the principles of the Charter and of
the System of Trusteeship. An administering State may not be acting ille-
gaily by declining to act upon a recommendation or series of recommenda-
tions on the same subject. But in doing so it acts at its peril when a point
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Summing up, then, it is the writer's view that General Assem-
bly resolutions on the legal regime of seabed mining, singly or in
series and irrespective of nomenclature or voting figures, do not
in themselves, as a matter of law, create binding legal rules. On
the other hand, they may well constitute an important part of a
broader law-creating process in the several ways described above,
and in this context, their various characteristics may be signifi-
cant. Accordingly, the objective of the following analysis of the
key General Assembly resolutions is to examine them in the
broader context in order to determine whether, taken with evi-
dence of related state practice, they have created binding legal
rules.
The Moratorium Resolution
The first of the two key resolutions, the Moratorium Resolu-
tion,4 1 was adopted by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions.
4 2
Given the number and importance of States opposing the resolu-
tion or abstaining in the vote, the adoption of this resolution un-
derlines the fact that approximately half of the States in the
United Nations were not prepared to give their support to the fol-
lowing declaration embodied in the resolution:
is reached when the cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the
articulate opinion of the Organisation is such as to foster the conviction
that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principles
and Purposes of the Charter. Thus an Administering State which consist-
ently sets itself above the solemnly and repeatedly expressed judgment of
the Organisation, in particular in proportion as that judgment approxi-
mates to unanimity, may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible
line between impropriety and illegality, between discretion and arbitrari-
ness, between the exercise of the legal right to disregard the recommenda-
tion and the abuse of that right, and that it has exposed itself to
consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction.
1955 I.C.J. 67, 120. This may well be true in relation to recommendations on South
Africa's responsibilities as an administering State but it is almost certainly not
true in relation to recommendations generally. Indeed, it is difficult to find any
dictum in the opinion which is clearly of general application. It is no doubt true
generally that a recommendation 'is... a legal act of the principal organ of the
United Nations which Members of the United Nations are under a duty to treat
with a degree of respect appropriate to a Resolution of the General Assembly," id.,
and that it would be wrong to treat General Assembly resolutions "as nominal, in-
significant and having no claim to influence the conduct of the Members." Id. at
122. That, however, does not take us very far.
41. See Moratorium Resolution, supra note 31, at 11.
42. The votes against the resolution included: Australia, Canada, France, Ja-
pan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
[P] ending the establishment of the aforementioned international regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from
all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be
recognized.43
The attitude of governments opposed to the Moratorium Reso-
lution is reflected in the following statement by Mr. Stevenson,
legal adviser of the United States State Department:
The Resolution is recommendatory and not obligatory. The United
States is, therefore, not legally bound by it. The United States is, however
required to give good faith consideration to the Resolution in determining
its policies.
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Charter states that "All Members, in order
to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from member-
ship, shall fulfill. in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accord-
ance with the present Charter." With the exception of certain expressly
delineated areas such as membership and the budget, however, the Gen-
eral Assembly is not empowered to make decisions which impose obliga-
tions upon Members. The Moratorium Resolution does not fall within one
of the special areas in which the General Assembly is empowered to make
binding decisions, but rather within the mandate of Articles 10 and 13 that
permits the General Assembly to discuss a matter within the scope of the
Charter and make recommendations. There is extensive authority that
such a resolution cannot impose upon a Member a legal obligation to im-
plement it.
The United States considers the recommendation contained in the Mor-
atorium Resolution an important statement to be given weight in the de-
termination of United States policy. The United States is not, however,
obligated to implement the recommendations and has made clear its op-
position to the concept.44
It must be concluded that, particularly for the twenty-eight
States voting against it, the Moratorium Resolution neither cre-
ated binding rules immediately nor provided a significant basis
for the future development of such rules. At the very most, it
could be said that States were simply required to give weight in
the determination of their national policies to the "important
statement" contained in this recommendation of the majority in
the General Assembly.
The Declaration of Principles Resolution
The Declaration of Principles Resolution was adopted by a vote
of 108 to none, with 14 abstentions. 45 Moreover, the draft adopted
by the First Committee of the General Assembly was itself the re-
sult of a majority vote (90 to none, with 11 abstentions) rather
43. Moratorium Resolution, supra note 31, at 11.
44. Hearings Before the Senate Special Subcomm. on the Outer Continental
SheUf, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1969) (statement of J. Stevenson, U.S. State Dep't).
45. Supra note 9.
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than of a consensus.46 It was hardly surprising, therefore, that
the Bulgarian delegation to the First Committee stated that: "the
presentation by this Committee of a document on which many
delegations have serious reservations and objections, and which
is not the result from a consensus, will neither facilitate our work
nor contribute to the solution of the problem."47
The Soviet delegation, in announcing that it too would abstain
from the vote in the First Committee, also stressed that approval
by the General Assembly of this draft cannot impose legal conse-
quences on States, since such decisions are merely of a recom-
mendatory character. 48
The majority, even of those States voting in favor of the Decla-
ration, were equally careful to limit its significance. The United
Kingdom delegation expressed two general reservations:
First, like any other resolution of the General Assembly, the draft resolu-
tion has in itself no binding force. Secondly and arising from this, must be
regarded as a whole and interpreted as a whole; as a whole, it has no dis-
positive effect until we have agreement on an international regime and, as
part of that agreement, we have a clear, precise and internationally ac-
cepted definition of the area to which the regime is to apply. My delega-
tion entirely endorses the view expressed by other delegations that it is
not the purpose of the draft declaration of principles to establish an in-
terim regime for the sea-bed.
4 9
Mr. Galindo Pohl, a Salvadoran delegate who played an impor-
tant role in the preparatory work which preceded the adoption of
the Declaration, confirmed that it was clearly understood in infor-
mal negotiations that it was not intended that the Declaration
should provide a provisional regime pending the conclusion of a
definitive conventional regime.
5 0
Perhaps the most accurate description of the Declaration was
given by Sir Laurence McIntyre, of Australia, when he expressed
his country's understanding of the principles as "general guide-
lines for the establishment of a regime for the sea-bed and an ear-
nest of the desire of the great majority of members to have a
regime; but we would not see them as having any binding or
46. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1798th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1798 (1970).
47. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1799th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799 (1970).
48. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1798th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1798 (1970).
49. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1799th mtg.) at 1, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799
(1970).
50. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1781st mtg.) at 2, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781
(1970).
mandatory effect upon States in the meantime."5 '
Sir Laurence went on to make it clear that the Declaration
should not prejudge or restrict the scope of matters that in fact can be de-
termined effectively only through the negotiation of an international
agreement or agreements at a conference on questions of the law of the
sea and the sea-bed. A declaration of principles cannot be used as a sub-
stitute for the decisions that will ultimately emerge from such a
conference.
52
Similar statements were made by, inter alia, Canada,53 Norway,5 4
and Peru.55
Comments on the status of the concept of the common heritage
of mankind also indicate the limited effect of the Declaration of
Principles. Thus, the Byelorussian delegate rejected it as a legal
principle:
Speaking of legal principles, we should like to stress that, as in the past,
the Byelorussian delegation cannot support the concept that the sea-bed
and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and their re-
sources, are the common heritage of mankind in the sense of being a form
of collective property of all countries. This idea does not take into account
the objective situation in today's world, where there are States having dif-
ferent social systems and different systems of ownership. Such a concept,
as was evident in the work of the sea-bed Committee, makes more difficult
the working out and adoption of legal principles consonant with the inter-
ests of all States. 56
The Canadian delegation also did not regard the concept as a le-
gal principle at this stage:
We agree also that the resources of the area should be considered to be
the common heritage of mankind, although at this stage we view this not
so much as a legal principle but rather as a concept to which the interna-
tional community can give specific legal meaning and upon which it can
construct the machinery and the rules of international law which will to-
gether comprise the legal regime for the area ... beyond national
jurisdiction.
57
Speaking in the General Assembly on December 17, 1970, the
late Mr. Amerasinghe, the President of UNCLOS II, said: 'The
51. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (177th mtg.) at 7, para. 49, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1777
(1970).
52. Id. para. 50.
53. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1779th mtg.) at 3, para 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1779
(1970) ("balanced and comprehensive enough to serve as the foundations and
framework for an international regime").
54. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1774th mtg.) at 5, para. 40, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1774
(1970) (the principles are "indications... of the rules and the provisions of inter-
national law ... To make them applicable and enforceable ... we shall [later]
have to hammer out detailed legal provisions").
55. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1777th mtg.) at 5, para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1777
(1970) ("only a basis for the preparation of a regime and must not be interpreted
as an interim regime").
56. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1780th mtg.) at 11, para. 108, U.N. Doc. A/C.i/PV.1780
(1970).
57. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1779th mtg.) at 2, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1779
(1970).
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Declaration cannot claim the binding force of a treaty internation-
ally negotiated and accepted, but it is a definite step in that direc-
tion and... it has-if I may adapt the words of Walt Whitman-
that fervent element of moral authority that is more binding than
treaties."5 8 Echoing this assessment, the most reasonable conclu-
sion would seem to be that, at the time of the adoption of the Dec-
laration of Principles, the concept of the common heritage of
mankind could not properly be regarded as a legal principle but
embodied guidelines which the community of States had under-
taken a moral commitment to follow in good faith in the elabora-
tion of a legal regime for the area beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the Declaration of Principles is a much more
important instrument than the Moratorium Resolution, in the
sense that it clearly has a number of features which give it the po-
tential to constitute a significant part of a wider law-creating pro-
cess. It has the "formality" and "solemnity" of a Declaration,
arguably enunciating "principles of great and lasting impor-
tance";59 it purports to be a declaration of principles and the prin-
ciples "solemnly declared" in its operative paragraphs are
formulated in relatively precise, treaty-like language. Although
incapable of creating binding legal rules in itself, as a General As-
sembly resolution, it does therefore nonetheless provide an emi-
nently suitable basis for the generation of legally binding rules
through a broader process. Before a final judgment can be made
on its longer-term impact, therefore, it is necessary to examine re-
lated evidence in subsequent state practice in order to determine
whether a rule of customary international law has grown out of it,
or whether States have become bound by consensual agreements
or unilateral acts formulated by reference to it.
There have been innumerable statements made since 1970 on
the status of the Declaration of Principles and more particularly
on that of the common heritage principle. It will suffice, however,
to examine a number of the more important instruments and
statements which reflect the attitudes of the two main schools of
thought: that of the Group of 77 that the common heritage princi-
ple is now part of international law, and that of some of the lead-
58. 25 U.N. GAOR (1933d mtg.) at 21, para. 245, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1933 (1970).
59. Memorandum on the Use of the Terms "Declaration and Recommenda-
tion," supra note 34.
ing industrialized States that it will not attain that status until it
is incorporated in an acceptable convention.
It would be fair to say that, although many of the leading mem-
bers of the Group of 77 acknowledged in 1970 that the Declaration
of Principles was not legally binding and did not create an interim
regime for seabed mining, their present view is that the Declara-
tion, together with other General Assembly resolutions, state-
ments made in the course of UNCLOS HI negotiations and the
work of other international institutions and conferences, provides
clear evidence that the common heritage principle is binding
upon all States as a matter of customary international law. Four
instruments illustrate this point of view: (1) the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States;60 (2) a resolution adopted by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Board on September 17, 1978 on 'The Exploitation of
the Seabed beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction";61 (3) a
statement declaring the position of the Group of 77 on unilateral
legislation affecting the resources of the deep seabed, made in the
Plenary of UNCLOS I on September 15, 1978 by a representative
of Fiji on behalf of the Group of 77;62 and (4) a letter dated April
23, 1979 from the Group of Legal Experts on the Question of Uni-
lateral Legislation to the Chairman of the Group of 77.63
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 1974
The Charter64 was adopted by the General Assembly on De-
cember 12, 1974 and had as its fundamental purpose the promo-
tion of "the establishment of the new international economic
order [NIEO], based on equity, sovereign equality, interdepen-
dence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irre-
spective of their economic and social systems."65 There is no
doubt that the intention of the General Assembly was "to estab-
lish or improve norms of universal application" 66 and that the
Charter was viewed as "the first step in the codification and de-
velopment of the mattr."67 This intention does not, however, al-
ter the fact that the Charter was adopted as a part of a General
Assembly resolution. It is in this context that article 29 of the
60. 29 U.N. GAOR (2315th plen. mtg.) at 100, U.N. Doc. A/3281 (1974), reprinted
in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 251 (1975).
61. 18 UNCTAD C.1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/SC.1/L.2 (1978).
62. 9 UNCLOS 1I 103-04 (109th plen. mtg.) (1979).
63. 11 UNCLOS 1I 80, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/77 (1980).
64. See supra note 60.
65. Id. at 252 (Preamble of Charter).
66. Id. at 251 (Preamble of Resolution).
67. Id. at 252.
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Charter has to be appreciated. Article 29, part of chapter III on
"Common responsibilities towards the international community,"
provides that:
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the com-
mon heritage of mankind. On the basis of the principles adopted by the
General Assembly in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all
States shall ensure that the exploration of the area and exploitation of its
resources are carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the
benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all States, taking into
account the particular interests and needs of developing countries; an in-
ternational regime applying to the area and its resources and including
appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be
established by an international treaty of a universal character, generally
agreed upon.68
Article 29 contains the only reference to this question in the
Charter and although, as will be seen, UNCTAD has continued to
take an interest in seabed mining, it cannot be said that this as-
pect of the NIEO has been significantly developed by UNCLOS
I. An examination of the voting figures serves to underline that
the Charter has little evidentiary value in relation to the legal re-
gime of seabed mining.
69
The UNCTAD Resolution of September 17, 1978
The resolution on "The Exploitation of the Seabed beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction" adopted by the Trade and Devel-
opment Board of UNCTAD on September 17, 197870 originated in a
draft submitted by Colombia on behalf of the Group of 77.71 The
Preamble to the resolution made reference to the Moratorium
Resolution and the Declaration of Principles and to the considera-
tion "that any unilateral actions designed to carry on the exploita-
tion of the area, before a Convention on the Law of the Sea is
adopted, would violate the aforementioned resolutions of the
General Assembly. ... 72 The operative paragraphs went on, in-
ter alia, to call upon all States to refrain from adopting unilateral
68. Id. at 260.
69. Id. at 265. The following six States voted against the adoption of the reso-
lution: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, United
Kingdom and United States. The ten countries abstaining were Austria, Canada,
France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Spain. The Second
Committee of the General Assembly adopted article 29 by 113 votes to none, with
17 abstentions. Id.
70. See supra note 61.
71. Id. at 1.
72. Id. at 2.
legislation pending the conclusion of the UNCLOS negotiations;73
to reiterate "that any unilateral actions in contravention of the
pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly would not be rec-
ognized by the international community and would be invalid ac-
cording to international law";74 and to stress "that States which
n-ight undertake such unilateral actions would have to assume
the responsibility for their consequences both on the outcome of
[UNCLOS UT] and on negotiations on commodities related to the
exploitation of mineral resources from the sea-bed."75
Although adopted by a large majority (65 to 8, with 12 absten-
tions), the evidentiary value of this resolution is again blighted by
the fact that a significant number of powerful industrialized
States voted against its adoption.7 6 The United States representa-
tive, speaking on behalf of the dissenters, reaffirmed their view
that deep seabed mining legislation was lawful. The final passage
of his statement is typical of innumerable official statements
made since that time, in placing emphasis on (1) the interim na-
ture of the legislation and (2) the need to ensure continuity of in-
vestment pending ratification and entry into force of a generally
acceptable Convention.77
Group of 77 Statements
Two of the clearest statements of the position of the Group of 77
are to be found in a speech made by its chairman in the UNCLOS
Plenary on September 15, 1978 and a letter addressed to the said
chairman by a group of legal experts. Since the latter is more de-
tailed and comprehensive, attention will be concentrated on its
arguments first, before turning to comment briefly on the earlier
statement.
Letter dated April 23, 1979 from the Group of Legal Experts
on the Question of Unilateral Legislation to the Chairman of
the Group of 7778
The Group of Legal Experts was established to express in the
most precise form possible the Group of 77's repeatedly-declared
"clear legal conviction concerning the binding nature of the prin-
ciples set out in" the 1970 Declaration of Principles and its posi-
73. Id. at 2, para. 1.
74. Id. at 2, para. 2.
75. Id. at 2, para. 3.
76. The dissenters included the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan,
United Kingdom and the United States. Id.
77. Id.
78. 9 UNCLOS 1I 81 (1979).
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tion on interim unilateral legislation.79 The twelve-member group
included no fewer than five members of the International Law
Commission.80 The letter, which was circulated in UNCLOS III at
the request of the Chairman of the Group of 77, can be taken as a
precise statement of the considered legal opinion of some of the
leading international lawyers drawn from all regions of the devel-
oping world. It is therefore deserving of careful analysis.
The Group's "basic points" are presented under six headings.
"Development of the international law of the sea"
In this section, the Group opens by stating that "[n] either the
Convention on the High Seas, signed in 1958, nor general interna-
tional law includes among the freedoms of the high seas the ex-
ploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea-bed
and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."8 1
Without supporting analysis such a bald statement is virtually
worthless. It makes no attempt to refute, and indeed betrays no
awareness of the existence of, the argument that any activity
which is not expressly prohibited by international law is a permit-
ted freedom of the high seas.
The Group then reviews the history of the United Nations' con-
cern with this subject but, it must be said, in a highly biased fash-
ion. For example, in referring to the Moratorium Resolution and
UNCTAD Resolution 52 of May 19, 1972, no indication at all is
given of the clear statements of opposition or reservation of posi-
tions made by the principal western industrialized States. Simi-
larly, it hardly suffices to refer, without supporting argument, to
the "mandatory principles" incorporated in the 1970 Declaration
of Principles.
"The binding nature of the fundamental principles
governing the area"
This second section of the letter deserves quotation in full:
The principles set out in the Declaration contained in resolution 2749
(XXV) are legally binding principles which were proclaimed in this Dec-
laration and upheld by the affirmative vote of 108 States. It should be ad-
ded that a number of the few States (14) which abstained on that
occasion, although without formulating any objection, subsequently ex-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
pressed, either explicitly or implicitly, their support for those principles,
as did other States members of the international community, thus recog-
nizing by their attitude the force of international custom as expressed in
.resolution 2749 (XXV).
This custom has given rise to new general principles of public interna-
tional law which are the basis or legal foundation of any substantive
norms regulating the exploration of the area of the sea-bed and the ocean
floor and the subsoil thereof and the exploitation of their resources.
82
It is, to put it mildly, more than a little, misleading to describe
the States abstaining from voting on the Declaration of Principles
as having done so "without formulating any objection" 83 and as
having subsequently expressed their support for those principles.
As has already been shown, the leading industrialized States
have been consistently careful since 1970 to place on record their
view that the Declaration has not led to the establishment of new
rules of international law.
The law-creating capacity of General Assembly resolutions in
general and the potential law-generating capacity of the Declara-
tion of Principles have already been considered. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to comment further on the claim that the Declara-
tion and the subsequent expressions of support for its principles
have generated new "international custom" and that this custom
"has given rise to new general principles of public international
law."84
"Normative relationship of the principles applicable to
the area"
The Group here asserts that all of the principles contained in
the Declaration of Principles
form a normative unity that is indivisible and applicable to the area. This
normative unity consolidates the applicable principles laid down in the
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
85
Comment on this passage is difficult in the absence of further
elaboration. No one would deny that the principles of the Decla-
ration form part of an indivisible unity. This is another way of
saying that the principle of the common heritage of mankind is
the sum total of all the more particular principles incorporated in
the Declaration. Such a proposition does not, however, have any




85. Id. at 81-82.
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"Legal status of the area"
This section opens with the following statement:
The customary principle of the freedom of the high seas is not an absolute
principle; it does not apply to the exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean
floors beyond national jurisdiction, because the exploitation thereof was
beyond the capacity of States at the time when that principle came into
being.
8 6
Once again, this argument reflects an inadequate understanding
of the nature of the principle of freedom of the high seas. It sug-
gests that a closed list of freedoms existed at some time in the
past and that positive evidence is required to prove that a new
use has subsequently been added to that list. In reality the onus
lies on those seeking to establish that a particular use is prohib-
ited. The scope of freedom of the high seas is not static or frozen
at any point of time.
The Group then goes on to argue as follows:
But even on the assumption that this customary principle would be appli-
cable to this exploitation, it would certainly have ceased to be applicable
in consequence of the Declaration of Principles of 1970, not only because
the Declaration is a resolution adopted by the General Assembly but also
because it is an event reflecting a conviction incompatible with opinio
juris sive necessitatis indispensable to the operation of the principle as an
international custom in the exploitation of the sea-bed or ocean floor be-
yond national jurisdiction.
87
Here too, we encounter a novel view of the law-creating processes
of international law. The Group's case can be restated as follows:
1. Assume that seabed mining was a high seas freedom under
customary international law.
2. Its status as a high seas freedom has now been terminated as
a consequence of the adoption of the Declaration of Principles
because:
(i) the Declaration is a resolution adopted by the General
Assembly;
(ii) the adoption of the Declaration extinguishes one of the
essential constituent elements (opinio juris) of the rule
of customary law that seabed mining is a high seas
freedom.
In other words, the contention is that the rights of a number of
powerful industrialized States established in customary interna-
tional law may be extinguished without their consent-indeed
86. Id. at 82.
87. Id.
over their protests-by a General Assembly resolution. Once
again the onus has been misplaced. It lies upon those seeking to
deprive States of rights enjoyed under customary international
law to prove that, as a result of the operation of recognized law-
creating processes, a new rule of international law, binding upon
such States, has been created, extinguishing their rights. This
onus has certainly not been discharged in this letter.
Finally, in this section, the Group argues that:
There is an obvious difference in legal status as regards the superjacent
waters of the area and as regards the sea-bed, subsoil and resources of the
area.
Whereas the legal status of the superjacent waters is that of res com-
munis, the legal status of the sea-bed, subsoil and resources thereof is
that of an indivisible and inalienable common heritage of mankind .... 88
It will suffice to say that this proposition assumes what has to be
proved and the remainder of the paragraph offers no convincing
proof.
"The legal principles applicable to the area and
unilateral acts or limited agreements for its
exploration and exploitation"
This section of the letter too deserves quotation in extenso, rep-
resenting as it does the firmly held opinion of the Group of 77 de-
veloping States:
The principles of law laid down in resolution 2749 (XXV) form the basis
of any international regime applicable to the area and its resources.
All activities connected with the exploration and exploitation of the area
and other related activities will be governed by the international regime to
be established by the conclusion of an international treaty that is gener-
ally acceptable and includes appropriate international machinery for im-
plementing the principles of law referred to.
Consequently, any unilateral act or mini-treaty is unlawful in that it vio-
lates these principles, for the legal regime, whether provisional or defini-
tive, can only be established with the consent of the international
community...
The adoption of unilateral measures, draft legislation and limited agree-
ments would merely be an event without international legal effect and
hence incapable of being invoked vis-a-vis the international community.
The great majority of States would not admit the validity of such legisla-
tion, nor could such legislation constitute valid grounds for any juridical
claim to explore or exploit the area. Furthermore, if such unilateral legis-
lation or mini-treaty should be put into operation, the international re-
sponsibility of the States concerned would be engaged in respect of
damage caused by such activities incompatible with the principles appli-
cable in the area.
It should be stressed that no investor would have any legal guarantee
for his investments in such activities, for he would likewise be subject to
individual or collective action by the other States in defence of the com-
88. Id.
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mon heritage of mankind, and no purported diplomatic protection would
carry any legal weight whatsoever.89
In light of the above comments on earlier sections of the letter, it
is not necessary to comment further on the legal arguments im-
plicit in these several propositions beyond saying that none of
them is soundly based in law. These assertions stand or fall with
the principal arguments on the legal regime of seabed mining.
"Rule of Law"
In the final sections of the letter, the Group alleges that the con-
clusion of a mini-treaty or the adoption of unilateral legislation
and any attempt to carry them into effect would be inconsistent
with the principles of good faith in the conduct of negotiations at
international plenipotentiary conferences like UNCLOS m.
Given the protracted duration of the Conference, the declared in-
terim nature of the unilateral legislation and the reservation of
position made by the States concerned, this is clearly not a tena-
ble proposition.
Speech of Chairman of Group of 77, September 15, 197890
Mr. Nandan's speech covers much the same ground as the letter
from the Group of Legal Experts and is open to much the same
criticism. It is interesting to see what response it evoked from
spokesmen for the principal industrialized States.
Perhaps the clearest and most concise statement of a position
shared by the principal industrialized States was contained in the
French representative's contribution, when he said:
[L] egally speaking, the argument put forward by the spokesman for the
Group of 77 to the effect that unilateral exploitation of the sea-bed was un-
lawful was not valid. It should be clearly understood that no Government
could be bound under international law unless it agreed to be so bound in
a treaty, and that in no case could a Government be bound by a legal rule
which others sought to impose on it. France had never agreed to any limi-
tations on the freedoms of the sea in so far as they related to the exploita-
tion of he sea-bed apart from those limitations which it might have
accepted by treaty or within the framework of the development of interna-
tional customary law. There were no provisions in existing international
positive law which prohibited the reasonable exploitation of the sea-bed
on an individual basis.9 1
89. Id.
90. 9 UNCLOS HI 103 (1979).
91. Id. at 106, para. 43.
Similar statements were made by representatives of Belgium, 92
the Federal Republic of Germany,93 Italy,94 the United Kingdom9 5
and the United States.9 6 Japan, though stating that it had "no
plan at present for national legislation regarding the exploitation
of the sea-bed," nevertheless went on record as believing that
"the unilateral legislation which some countries intended to adopt
in no way contradicted the concept of the common heritage of
man embodied in General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV)," and
that "the question of the legality of such measures ... could not
be raised as long as no convention had been concluded." 97
The Significance of the "Practice" of the Group of 77
The purpose of the above review of key documents reflecting
the '"practice" of the Group of 77 is to provide a basis for assess-
ing the extent to which that practice had contributed to the devel-
opment into binding rules of law of the principles enunciated in
the Declaration of Principles.
What this practice signifies is that some 119 States recognize
the principles enunciated in the Declaration as now being part of
international law and regard the adoption and application of uni-
lateral interim legislation as being in breach of binding rules of
international law. It is true that the figure of 119 States may be
regarded as somewhat misleading if it is analyzed in terms of
size, population, wealth and contribution to the United Nations
budget, but it still represents a remarkable proportion of the in-
ternational community. More important, however, is the legal ba-
sis of the contention that their practice has transformed the non-
binding principles of the Declaration of Principles into rules of in-
ternational law, despite the opposition of a group of large, densely
populated, highly industrialized, wealthy States which together
contribute nearly half of the United Nations budget.98 With due
respect to the opinion expressed by the Group of 77's Group of
Legal Experts, there is no foundation for the proposition that the
Declaration of Principles and related practice provide evidence of
the creation of generally applicable rules of international law. As
has been seen, the Declaration itself has no law-creating status;
92. Id. at 107, para. 53.
93. Id. at 106, paras. 45-46.
94. Id. at 107, paras. 51-52.
95. Id. at 107-08, paras. 60-61.
96. Id. at 104-05, paras. 27-29.
97. Id. at 107, para. 54.
98. For example, in 1979 the Federal Republic of Germany (7.70%), France
(5.82%), Italy (3.38%), the United Kingdom (4.52%), and the United States (25%)
funded 46.42% of the United Nations budget. 32 U.N.Y.B. 1039-40 (1981).
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nor, taken with the related practice, does it enable us to say that
it evidences the opinio juris generalis which constitutes a vital in-
gredient of a new rule of customary international law. Nor can it
be said that this overall corpus of evidence is tantamount to a
consensual engagement creating binding rules of international
law of universal validity. In truth, it indicates only that a large
number of developing States share the same view of the law.
Practice of the Industrialized States
Recapitulating, the industrialized States voted in favor of the
Declaration of Principles but made it clear both in concurrent
statements and consistently during the UNCLOS I debate that
they did not regard the Declaration as constituting an interim le-
gal regime and would continue to regard seabed mining as a high
seas freedom until the principles were transformed into an ac-
ceptable convention.
There are, however, various other aspects of the industrialized
states' practice which remain to be considered. The first is that
there is a consistent theme running through Conference state-
ments made by the four principal industrialized States to the ef-
fect that they remain committed to the conclusion and entry into
force of a Convention on the law of the sea which will give legal
precision to the principle that the mineral resources of the deep
seabed are the common heritage of mankind. For example, re-
sponding to the statement of the Group of 77's position made in
Plenary on September 15, 1978,99 the British representative said:
As far as the Conference was concerned, interim legislation pending a
successful convention would simply aim, as a piece of domestic house-
keeping, to regulate entry into the new field in order to ensure orderly
progress and the essential continuity of investment needed to develop the
new technology. Progress must not be held up, for it was in the interests
of the world's consumers of minerals, which included not only the United
Kingdom but most developing countries. Interim legislation would be no
more than a temporary umbrella which would in no way jeopardize the re-
sults of the Conference if it continued to do its work .... The Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom remained fully committed to the successful
conclusion of a comprehensive and generally acceptable convention as
soon as it could be achieved. 0
Paradoxically, the same commitment to the achievement of a
comprehensive conventional regime based on the principle of the
common heritage of mankind is reflected in the unilateral legisla-
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
100. 9 UNCLOS 1I 107-08 (1979).
tion now adopted by five States and in a number of official state-
ments made about the relationship of the legislation to the
Declaration of Principles and the Convention on the Law of the
Sea. A full analysis of the legislation adopted by the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom
and France will be found elsewhereO and here it will suffice to
comment briefly on three common aspects of the legislation: its
alleged interim character, its alleged compatibility with the
emerging UNCLOS regime and its embodiment of certain com-
mon heritage elements.
The principal justification offered for the adoption of these stat-
utes so late in the UNCLOS proceedings was that the work of the
mining consortia had reached a critical stage, at which it was nec-
essary to make a crucial decision whether or not to proceed to the
next stage, which would involve very large investments. Legisla-
tion was therefore needed to ensure continuity of investment at a
high level and the retention by the consortia of specialized teams
working on their pilot projects. It was, however, reiterated that
the legislation was only interim and designed to provide a secure
legal basis for investment only until a convention entered into
force. The aforementioned passage quoted from the British state-
ment of September 15, 1978102 is typical of many such assurances.
As further proof of their positive attitude to the achievement of
a conventional regime based on the common heritage doctrine, in-
dustrialized States have stressed ab initio that their unilateral
legislation is designed to be compatible with the emerging UN-
CLOS regime. For example, it was claimed during the passage of
the British Act through Parliament that: "[t]he Bill is consistent
with the proposals developed at the Conference. It has been spe-
cifically designed to be compatible with an internationally agreed
regime, as envisaged in the draft convention."l0 3
Similarly, Mr. Richardson informed the UNCLOS plenary that:
The United States Government had ... worked with the Congress in
framing legislation compatible with the primary goal of the Conference,
namely, the negotiation of a comprehensive law of the sea convention
.... [T] hat legislation was fundamentally consonant with the aims of the
Conference, which it could be hoped would adopt an international sea-bed
regime well before exploitation could be begun under the terms of na-
tional legislation.1° 4
Admittedly, national legislation falls short of UNCLOS provi-
sions in areas such as site-banking, anti-monopoly provisions,
101. See, e.g., Brown, .supra note 4.
102. See supra text accompanying note 100.
103. PAr. DEB., H.C. 58 (Special Standing Committee, Second Sitting) (June 2,
1981).
104. 9 UNCLOS 1I 104-05 (1979).
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production controls and transfer of technology. 05 The fact re-
mains, however, that it does include some common heritage ele-
ments. The legislation is intended to be interim; it makes
provision for the imposition of levies on mining licensees and the
establishment of revenue-sharing funds. It is compatible with the
Convention regime at least in the sense that provision could be
made by delegated legislation under it for such matters as site-
banking' 06 and transfer of technology, though there is no evidence
of any such intention at present.
What, then, is the significance of this practice of the industrial-
ized States? Have they, by their support for the Declaration of
Principles, their reiterated expressions of commitment to the ob-
jective of creating a conventional regime based upon the common
heritage principle, and their assurance of the interim nature of
their unilateral legislation and of its compatibility with the emerg-
ing conventional regime, contributed to the transformation of the
common heritage principle into binding rules of international
law? The obstacle in the way of any such conclusion is that all
such governmental actions and statements have invariably been
accompanied by clear reservations to the effect that, pending the
acceptance by them of a conventional regime giving precision to
the common heritage principle, they regard deep sea mining as a
freedom of the high seas.
On the other hand, there are grounds for questioning whether
this practice has left the freedom of deep sea mining in its pris-
tine, pre-1967 position. There may be room for a more modest
conclusion-that the industrialized States which have adopted
unilateral legislation are bound to exercise the freedom of deep
sea mining not only with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of freedom of the high seas, but also
in accordance with the fundamental principle of the common her-
itage of mankind. The argument would start from the premises
that although the Declaration of Principles 0 7 incorporates and
develops the fundamental principle of the common heritage of
mankind, it is only one of many possible models whereby the fun-
damental principle could be developed into more detailed norms
and that this particular model is not binding in law. If the truth of
105. See Brown, supra note 4, at 159, 161-62, 170.
106. See id. at 160.
107. See supra note 9.
this premise is not self-evident, it will become readily apparent
when the history of the UNCLOS negotiations is recalled. Over
the years, the Conference considered a number of quite different
models to give detailed effect in the Convention to the principle of
the common heritage of mankind. Any one of them, had it even-
tually emerged as the preferred model for incorporation in Part
XI of the Convention, would have been regarded as the legitimate
concretization of the fundamental principle.
Having established the distinction between the fundamental
principle itself and any particular development of it, the next step
in the argument is that the above review of the state practice of
the industrialized States suggests that they have accepted the
fundamental principle, but not its detailed development in either
the Declaration of Principles or the Convention on the Law of the
Sea. It would then be necessary to consider what limitations on
the freedom of deep sea mining are imposed by this acceptance of
the fundamental principle. Arguably, the answer is that the in-
dustrialized States would be bound by the most basic of the prin-
ciples enunciated in the Declaration of Principles and accepted by
them in practice. They would, for example, be bound by para-
graph two of the Declaration, forbidding appropriation or claims
to sovereignty or the exercise of sovereign rights over the Area.
They would likewise be bound by paragraph seven, which pro-
vides that the exploration of the Area and the exploitation of its
resources must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of developing countries. However, these obligations are
stated at a very high level of abstraction and leave considerable
scope for interpretation by States concerned. It is thus possible
to contend that the unilateral legislation of industrialized States
is not inconsistent with these principles: they do not involve any
appropriation of, or assertion of sovereign rights over, the area,
and their provisions for revenue-sharing do take into account the
interests and needs of developing countries. On the other hand,
pending elaboration and acceptance of a precise conventional re-
gime, paragraphs four and nine of the Declaration of Principles
(envisaging the establishment of an international regime and ap-
propriate international machinery) would not affect the interim
right of the industrialized States to continue to exercise the high
seas freedom of seabed mining, subject only to observance of the
basic rules referred to above.
Thus, the practice of industrialized States indicates that what
they have accepted is a fundamental principle which is open to
elaboration in countless different ways (in relation, for example,
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to production controls, transfer of technology, financial arrange-
ments and representation in institutions); that they have not yet
accepted a moratorium on seabed mining pending the elaboration
and acceptance of such a detailed regime; and that their unila-
teral legislation is designed to reflect their acceptance that the ex-
ercise of the high seas freedom of seabed mining is now limited
by the basic norms stated above.
Clearly, this whole argument rests on shaky foundations since,
to survive, it has to surmount the obstacle presented by the insis-
tence over the years by the industrialized powers that seabed
mining would remain a high seas freedom until they accepted an
alternative conventional regime. Moreover, even if valid, the ar-
gument is of dubious worth. What it would prove would simply
be that the industrialized States were bound, negatively, not to
appropriate or make sovereign claims to the area-which they
have no wish to do-and, positively, to take into particular consid-
eration the interests and needs of developing countries. As has
been seen, the statutory provisions on revenue-sharing can be
considered as having given some effect to this obligation. Closer
inspection of these provisions shows, however, that the funds are
clearly intended to have a short life and it is by no means clear if,
or how, on winding up, they will be distributed for the benefit of
the developing States.108
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are presented on the present status
of the deep seabed and the present legal regime governing the ex-
ploitation of its mineral resources:
1. Prior to the establishment of the legal concept of the continen-
tal shelf, States could acquire an exclusive usufruct of re-
sources situated on the continental margin beyond the
territorial sea limit by the practical, effective assertion of such
claims, recognized by others.
2. Such rights have now been subsumed under the concept of
the continental shelf and the argument that they furnish a
fruitful source of analogy for exclusive title to manganese nod-
ules is strained. In any event, the opposition of the vast ma-
108. See Brown, supra note 4, at 164-170.
jority of States would today deny a claimant the recognition or
acquiescence necessary to support a claim made on this basis.
3. The evidence does not bear out the argument advanced in the
Northcutt Ely opinion that exclusive rights acquired in earlier
State practice were enjoyed in the exercise of a freedom of the
high seas. Nonetheless, the separate argument that exclusive
rights in deep seabed resources may be acquired today in the
exercise of a high seas freedom deserves close examination.
4. The right of users of the high seas may be exercised for any
purpose not expressly prohibited by international law. No
rule of international law prohibits the acquisition of an exclu-
sive usufruct of a seabed mining site. Subject to its being kept
within the bounds of reasonableness, both in terms of locus
and conduct of operations, such rights may be acquired in the
exercise of a high seas freedom.
5. General Assembly resolutions on the legal regime of seabed
mining, singly or in series and irrespective of nomenclature or
voting figures, do not in themselves, as a matter of law, create
binding legal rules. They may, however, constitute part of a
broader law-creating process.
6. The Moratorium Resolution neither created binding rules im-
mediately nor provided a significant basis for the future devel-
opment of such rules. Similarly, the Declaration of Principles
Resolution did not create binding rules, but did provide a sig-
nificant basis for the generation of legally binding rules
through a broader law-creating process.
7. The practice of Group of 77 indicates that at least 119 States
recognize the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Prin-
ciples as part of international law. Nonetheless, the Declara-
tion and the related practice of the Group of 77 does not
provide evidence of the creation of generally applicable rules
of international law.
8. The practice of industrialized States has not contributed sig-
nificantly to the transformation of the common heritage prin-
ciple into binding rules of international law. At most, it has
modified the conditions subject to which States may exercise
the freedom of deep sea mining. It must now be exercised in
accordance with the basic rules underlying the fundamental
principle of the common heritage of mankind. In practice,
however, any such obligations would be of very limited scope.
